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Article 6

THE BRONX HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH: LOOKING AT THE
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

In Bronx Household ol
. FaithI v. Board ol
. Education ol
. the Citv
. of
.
New York (Bronx Household If), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that "[t]he American experiment has flourished largely free
of the religious strife that has stricken other societies because church and
2
state have respected each other's autonomy." Additionally. the
American experiment has flourished in a general sense because it allows
for a "marketplace of ideas" through the free expression and debate of
3
thoughts and viewpoints. In recent years, both of these notions have
been tested and redefined through the legal process-a process that has
generated many unanswered questions and produced substantial conflicts
in the judicial system. Specifically, appellate courts throughout the
United States have differed on the question of whether "speech can be
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature
4
of the speech." In the wake of this conflict, courts have left the
American people with important questions regarding the relationship
between church and state and permissible limitations on religious speech
in public fora.
Nowhere has the balance between free expression and separation of
church and state become more tenuous than in the public school setting.

I.

l3ronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx

Hous~hold

II). 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir.

2003).

2. !d. at 355.
3. For an interesting look at religious viewpoints being banned from the marketplace of ideas
in an academic setting. sec John W. Hamilton. Bishop v. Aronov: Religion-tainted Vintpoints ar~
Bannu/ji-om the Marketplace of/dew·. 49 WASH. & LH' L. RLV. 1557 ( 1992)
4. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98. I 05-06 (200 I): com[Hll"<' Cicntala \.
Tucson. 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane) (holding that a city properly refused National Day
of Prayer organizers' application to the city's civic events ti.md for coverage of costs for city
services), Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
school's policy against permitting religious instruction in its limited public f()rum did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination), and l3ronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Seh. Dist. No. I 0 (lfmnx
Household/). 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that a ban on religious sel"\ices and
instruction in the limited public forum was constitutional), ll"ith Church on the Rock\". Albuquerque.
84 F.3d 1273 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that a city's denial of permission to show the film JI!.IUS in a
senior center was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination), and Good News/Good Sports Club v.
Sch. Dist., 2X F.3d 1501 (llth Cir. 1994) (holding unconstitutional a school usc policy that prohibited
Good News Club from meeting during times when the l3oy Scouts could meet).
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In 200 I, the Supreme Court's decision in Good News Club v. Milj(Jrd
Central School attempted to clarify some of the conflicts between
appellate courts on this issue by holding that restrictions in a limited
public forum against an organization with a religious viewpoint violated
5
the First Amendment's Free Speech clause. In spite of the Supreme
Court's attempt, the Second Circuit's opinion in Bronx Household If,
which relied principally on reasoning in the Good Ne>vs Club decision,
shows that many important issues remain unresolved, particularly
whether a court could ever "identify a form of religious worship that is
divorced from the teaching of moral values" and whether "the state,
without imposing its own views on religion, ~could] define which values
are morally acceptable and which are not.") How the Supreme Court
chooses to resolve these questions in the future will "no doubt have
7
profound implications for relations between church and state."
Part I of this article discusses the three fora of expression recognized
by the United States Supreme Court and the standards governing
restrictions on speech in each type. Part II traces some of the Supreme
Court's precedents regarding use of school property for religious
purposes and presentation of religious viewpoints. Part Ill discusses and
analyzes the principal unresolved issue identified by the Bronx
Household II court that remains after the Supreme Court's decision in
Good News Club, namely whether courts may draw a permissible
distinction between religious viewpoint and religious worship in a
limited public forum. This section concludes by arguing that, in the wake
of Good News Club, the Bronx Household II opinion shows that a court's
ability to identify a form of "religious worship, divorced from any
8
teaching of moral values," and thus permit its exclusion from a limited
public forum, is both unlikely and potentially problematic in practical
application.
I. TYPES OF EXPRESSIVE FORA

The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to express
ideas and thoughts while on public property-even when the expression
Good News Club. 533 U.S at 120.
Bronx Household II. 331 F.3d at 355.
7. !d. Since the Second Circuit's 2002 ruling in Bmnx Household II. more than two dozen
churches and religious groups now hold religious services in New York City public school buildings.
primarily because the schools offer a more affordable alternative to other potential facilities. See
Benjamin Weiser & Susan Saulny, On Sundays, Hymn Books Replace Text Hooks in City Schools.
N.Y. TlMES, Feb. 6. 2005. ~ I, at 25. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005102/06/nyregion/
06church.html.
8. Bronx 1/ouscho/d II, 331 F.3d at 354.
5.

6.
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is religious in nature. Expression, however, may occasionally be limited
by the government who, like a private property owner, may regulate
10
speech and preserve property for the use to which it is dedicated.
Whether a particular restriction on speech or activity is permissible
depends on the nature of the forum where the expressive activity takes
11
12
In Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n,
place.
the Supreme Court set forth three types of expressive fora and explained
13
the standards for regulation of speech in each of them.

A. Traditional Public Forum
The first category of public property where expression may take
place is the traditional public forum. Traditional public fora include
property such as "streets, parks, and places that 'by long tradition ...
14
have been devoted to assembly and debate."'
In a traditional public
forum, the government may occasionally restrict speech based on its
subject matter, but such regulations are '"subject to the highest scrutiny'
and 'survive onll if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
1
Restrictions on viewpoint are never constitutional in
state interest."'
16
this type of forum.

B. Limited Public Forum
The second category of public property is a limited public forum.
The government creates a limited public forum when it intentionally
designates "a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the

9. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390--91 (1993)
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788. 800 (1985)); see also
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 ( 1981) (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 ( 1981 )); Nicmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 ( 1951 ); Saia v.
N.Y., 334 U.S. 558 ( 1948); Laura Gastel. Is Good News No News fiJr Estahlishment Clause
Theon". 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 125, 133 (2002); Jason E. Manning, Good News Club v. Milford
Central School: Viewpoint Discrimination or Endorsement ol Religion", 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
833, 851 (2003 ).
10. Gastel, supra note 9, at 129.
II. See Rebecca A. Valk, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: A Critical Analysis of
the Estahlishment Clause as Applied to Puhlic Education, 17 ST. JOliN'S 1. LlCiAL COMMENT. 347,
351 (2003).
12. 460US 37(1984)
13. !d. at 45--47; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
14. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx Household f). 127 F.3d 207.
211 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at45).
15. !d. (quoting lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992))
16. Gastel. supra note 9, at 130.
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In a limited public forum, the
discussion of certain subjects."
government may permissibly reserve the forum for certain speakers and
topics; however, any restrictions on speech may not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint and must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the
18
forum. Governmental limitations on use of the forum are subject only
to minimal constitutional scrutiny when the proposed uses fall outside of
19
the purposes of the limited forum.
To determine whether a limited
public forum exists, courts generally look to policy, practice, and the
20
nature o f the property at Issue.
0

C. Nonpublic Forum
The third and final category of public property is the nonpublic
forum. A nonpublic forum is state-owned property that "has not been
21
opened for public speech either by tradition or by designation." In this
type of forum, the government may restrict access "on the basis of
2
subject matter and speaker identity."

II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DISCUSSING RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN A
PUBLIC SCHOOL SETTING

The Supreme Court has encountered several cases that illustrate the
difficulty in developing methods and rules for distinguishing between
religious worship and religious viewpoint. Without clear guidelines, it is
difficult for schools, particularly schools characterized as providing
limited public forums, to assess whether their actions are in violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
A. Widmar v. Vincent
23

Widmar v. Vincent,
a 1981 opinion, was the first United States
Supreme Court case involving access to school facilities by religious
24
groups. In that case, the University of Missouri at Kansas City granted

17. Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 802.
18. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (citing Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 ( 1995)).
19. Bmnx flouschold I. 127 F.3d at 212 (citing Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224.
229(2dCir. 1996))
20. Valk. supra note II. at 354 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
21. Bronx llouseho!d I, 127 F.3d at 212 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Educators' Ass'n ..
460 U.S. 37.46 ( 19H4)).
22. Parv, 460 U.S. at 49.
23. 454 U.S. 263 ( I'JH I).
24. Michael D. Baker. Protecting Religious Speakers' Access to l'uhlic School Facilities:
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permission for over one hundred student clubs, including a religious
group named Cornerstone, to conduct club meetings in school
25
facilities. After four years of allowing the club to meet on campus, the
university revoked Cornerstone's permission to usc school facilities
pursuant to a regulation that prohibited the use of university buildings
26
'"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. "' The district
court upheld the regulation, finding that "it was not on!~ justified, but
7
required" by the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the
regulation was an impermissible content-based restriction against
religious speech, which the university failed to justify by compelling
28
means.
The court also held that the Establishment Clause is not
offended by allowing a religious group to meet on a university campus
29
when facilities are open to a wide variety of groups and speakers. To
the contrary, the primary effect of an equal-access policy would not
advance religion, but would further students' intellectual curiosity and
. I awareness. 30
soc1a
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit,
reasoning that the university had created a forum generally open to
31
student groups. Having done so, it was required to justify its exclusion
of a student group that wished to engage in religious worship and
32
discussion by a compelling state interest.
The court described the
State's asserted interest in preventing an Establishment Clause violation
as possibly "compelling," but ultimately concluded, after applying the
Lemon test, that an equal access policy would not offend the
33
Establishment Clause.
Since the university opened its facilities to a
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District, 44 CASE W. RES. L. RI'V. 315,317 (1993).
25.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.

!d. (quoting university regulation 4.0314.0107, adopted by the 13oard of Curators in llJ72).
27. !d. at 263; Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.O. Mo. llJ7'!)

26.

2g. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1316 (Hth Cir. 1980).
2lJ.

/d. at 1317.

30. !d. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar, Congress passed the Equal
Access Act, Pub. L. No. 9g-377, 9R Stat. 1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C. ~~ 4071-4074 (2000)), which
requires school districts that receive federal money and allow noncurricu1ar activities and club
meetings in their facilities to grant similar access to students who wish to hold religious meetings in
the schools. The constitutionality of the Equal Access Act was upheld in Hoard of" Education of the
Westside Communi(r School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). KERN ALLXAt-;DER & 1\1. DA\ID
ALEXANDER. AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 22H (6th ed. 2005).
31.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.

32. !d. at 270.
33. !d. at 271; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 612- 13 ( 1971 ). The Lemon Test
requires that: (I) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose." /d. at 612: (2) "its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." !d. (citing Bd. of Educ. \
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)): and (3) "[it] must not foster 'an excessive government
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wide variety of student groups, it could not exclude certain groups solely
34
because of the content of their speech. The court eventually held that
the State's asserted interest in preventing an Establishment Clause
violation was not sufficiently compelling to justify its content-based
. . . . 15
d1scnmmat10n. ·
B. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District
36

In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether it was a violation
of "the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ... to deny a church
access to school premises to exhibit for ... assertedly reli?Jous purposes,
7
a film series dealing with family and child rearing issues." In this case,
the local school board adopted a regulation allowing outside groups to
use school facilities for social, civic, or recreational uses, but not for
38
"religious purposes." Lamb's Chapel, a local church, sought to use
school facilities to show a film series about child rearing from a Christian
.
39
perspective.
The district court characterized the school's facilities as a limited
40
public forum and stated that once this type of forum is opened to a
particular type of speech, "selectively denying access to other activities
41
of the same genre is forbidden." However, because the school district
here had never opened its facilities for religious purposes, the denial was
42
viewpoint neutral and did not violate the Free Speech Clause.
The
43
Second Circuit affirmed "in all respects. "
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the government
can regulate subject matter and speaker identity on public property
designated as a limited public forum '"so long as the distinctions drawn
are reasonable in l~ht of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral."' The Supreme Court reversed the district court and

entanglement with religion."' !d. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 ( 1970)).
34. Widmar. 454 U.S. at 273.
35. ld at 276.
36. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
37. !d. at 387.
38. !d.
39. ld
40. !d. at 389. In viewpoint discrimination cases--especially those involving public schoolsthe type of forum involved is generally not highly disputed. Manning, supra note 9, at 851.
41. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389.
42. !d. at 390.
43. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389 (2d Cir. 1992).
44. Lamb's Chapel, 508 US. at 392-93 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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Second Circuit, holding that the "religious purposes" exclusion failed
.
45
this test.
The Second Circuit mischaracterized the issue in holding that the
exclusionary rule was viewpoint neutral since it would be applied to all
46
groups seeking to use the school property for religious purposes. The
proper inquiry, according to the Supreme Court, was "whether it
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be
used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child
rearing exce~t those dealing with the subject matter from a religious
4
The court reasoned that because presentations about
viewpoint. "
family values and child rearing issues were clearly within the scope of
permissible uses already allowed by the forum, the denial of the church's
presentation was based solely on the fact that it was from a religious
48
perspective.
The court held this to be impermissible viewpoint
49
discrimination, forbidden in a limited public forum setting. The court
also rejected the school district's argument that this distinction was
50
required to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.

C. Good News Club v. Milford Central School
51

Pursuant to state law, the school in Good News Club v. Milford
52
53
Central Schoo/ adopted a policy of permissible uses for its faciliti~s.
Specifically, the policy made the school facilities available for "'social,
civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses
54
pertaining to the welfare of the community."' The policy, however,
prohibited use "by any individual or organization for religious
purposes. "55
The Good News Club, a Christian organization for children ages six
to twelve, sought permission to use school facilities to hold its weekly
afterschool meetings, which consisted of singing songs, saying prayers,
56
hearing a Bible lesson, and playing games. The district superintendent

45.
46.

/d. at 393.
!d.
4 7. /d.

48

hi.

49.

l.amh 's Chap!'!. 508 US. at 394 (citing Cornl!!ius. 473 U.S. at 806).

50. !d at 395.
51. N.Y. Educ.

Law~

414 (McKinney 2000).

52. 533 U.S. 98 (200 I).
53. ld at 98, I 02.
54. !d at I 02.
55.

ld at I 03.

56.

ld
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reviewed the club's activities and concluded that they "were not a
discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, development of
character, and development of morals from a religious ~erspective, but
7
were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction itself."
Although the club was granted a preliminary injunction that allowed
them temporary use of the facilities, this was eventually vacated, and
Milford Central School was given summary judgment. sx A divided panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
holding that, because the subject matter of the club's activities was
''quintessentially religious" and its activities fell "outside the bounds of
pure 'moral and character development,"' the school's exclusionary
P?lic~ . w~s ~ermissible
content discrimination, not viewpoint
thscnmmatwn. ·
Due to the parties' stipulation, the United States Supreme Court
60
analyzed the free speech issue in the context of a limited open forum.
Finding the facts of this case indistinguishable from Lamb's Chapel and
61
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the court
determined that exclusion of the club was impermissible viewpoint
62
Since the forum had been opened to discussion of a
discrimination.
wide variety of topics such as the teaching of morals and character
development, as well as events pertaining to the welfare of the
community, exclusion of the Good News Club-who also taught morals
and character development-was based on the religious viewpoint it
63
espoused.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's assessment
that the club was "doing something other than simply teaching moral
64
values." The Supreme Court found that the Second Circuit erred in
characterizing the Christian viewpoint as unique because it contains "an
additional layer" that other viewpoints do not-"teaching children how
to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ"-which the
65
court called "quintessentially religious." The Supreme Court further
opposed the argument that something '"quintessentially religious' or
57. (;ood

.V~l\'1

Cluh. 533 U.S. at I 04.

58. Ciood News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
59. Ciood News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510-511 (2d Cir. 2000)
60.

Good Nc\\·s Cluh. 533 U S at I Oil.

61 515 U.S. Xl9 (1995) (holding that a university's refusal to fund a student newspaper
solely because the publication addressed issues from religious viewpoint violated the Free Speech
Clause).
62.

( ;uod Sell.\ Club. 533 U.S. at I 09 I 0.

63. ld
64. ld at II I (citing Good News C/uh. 202 F.3d at 51 0).
h5. !d at Ill (citing Good News Cluh. 202 F.3d at 509-10).

I]
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'decidedly religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as
the teachin~ of morals and character development from a particular
6
viewpoint." According to the Supreme Court, the incorrect "unstated
principle" of the Second Circuit's reasoning was "its conclusion that any
time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and
character the discussion is simply not a 'pure' discussion of those
67
issues." The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger that "speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects
cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the
68
subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint" As such, Milford's
refusal to allow the club to use its facilities was impermissible viewpoint
69
discrimination. The court also rejected Milford's contention that even
if it had engaged in viewpoint discrimination, such action was necessary
70
to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.
Justice Souter's dissent described the club's activities not as a "mere
discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view," but as
"an evangelical service of worship," where the "unsaved" children are
invited to receive Jesus as their savior from sin and the "saved" children
are challenged to "ask God for the strength and the 'want' ... to obey
71
him." In footnote four of the majority's opinion, the court agreed that
72
Justice Souter's recitation of the club's activities was accurate.
However, the majority responded that "regardless of the label Justice
Souter wishes to use, what matters is the substance of the club's
activities, which we conclude are materially indistinguishable from the
73
activities in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger." In those cases, like in
Good News Club, religion is the viewpoint or foundation from which the
74
speaker's ideas are conveyed.

66. Good Ne11·s C/uh, 533 U.S. at Ill (citing Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting)).
67. 1d
6R. ld at 112.
69. ld
70. ld The Court also noted that although in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,271 (1981), it
had hinted that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "may be characterized
as compelling" to the degree that it would justify content-based discrimination, the Court had not
decided whether a state's interest in preventing an Establishment Clause violation would justify
,·iewpoint discrimination. The Court declined to answer that question here since it concluded that the
school "has no valid Establishment Clause interest" that would justify the exclusion. Good News
Cluh, 533 U.S. at 113.
71. Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).

72. !d. at 112 n.4 (majority opinion).
73. !d.
74. !d.
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D. Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School District No. I 0
(Bronx Household I)

I. United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York
.
.
(1996/ 5
76

Pursuant to New York state law, the Board of Education of the
City of New York adopted standard operating procedures for the use of
school buildings. Among the many permitted uses are "instruction in any
branch of education" and "social, civic and recreational meetings ... and
77
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community." In addition, the
Standard Operating Procedures manual restricts use so that "no
outside . . . group may be allowed to conduct religious services or
religious instruction on school premises after school. However, the use of
school premises by outside ... groups after school for the purposes of
discussing religious material or material which contains a religious
.
. ... IS
. permiSSI
. 'bl e. "78
v1ewpomt
The Bronx Household of Faith sought to rent space in Anne Cross
79
Merseau Middle School to hold Sunday morning worship
meetings
consisting of "h~mn singing, communion, Bible reading, Bible preaching
and teaching." l When its initial application to rent the school was
denied in 1994 on the grounds that its intended use would violate the
religious services and instruction policy, the church filed suit in the
81
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The court first concluded that the school had created a limited public
82
forum. In this context, the exclusionary policy was reasonably related
to the school's legitimate interest in "preserving and prioritizing access"
to the school primarily for educational purposes, and secondarily, for
83
public and community activities. The district court granted summary
judgment for the Board of Education and dismissed Bronx Household's

75. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Seh. Dist. No. I 0. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 111044
(S.DNYI996)
76. N.Y. Educ.

Law~

414 (McKinney 1995).

!d.
7X. Bronx llotisehold of Faith, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 18044, at **3·4 (citing N.Y. City Bd.

77.

ofEduc .. Standard Operating Procedures~ 5.11 (formerly~ 5.9)).
79. !d at *2.
80. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0 (Bronx Household 1), 127 F.3d 207,
211 (2d Cir. 1997)

XI. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10. 1996 US Dist. LEXIS 18044
(S.D NY 1996).
82. !d at * 15.

X3.

ld at* 18.
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. 84
comp 1amt.
2. United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit (1997/

5

After being dismissed in district court, the case went to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals where the district court's decision to dismiss
86
the complaint was affirmed.
The Second Circuit distinguished
"between discrimination against speech because of its subject matter,
considered permissible to preserve the purposes of the limited forum, and
viewpoint discrimination, considered impermissible if directed against
87
speech within the limitations of the forum." Thus, the court held that
the exclusionary policy "preserves that distinction by prohibiting
religious worship and religious instruction by outside groups, a
prohibition that state authorities consider necessary to preserve the
purposes of the limited public school forum, and by specifically
permitting religious viewpoint speech in relation to matters for which the
88
public school forum is open."
The court recognized that although a film like the one in Lamb's
Chapel would have been allowed under the use policy because it treats a
subject already permitted in the forum, Lamb's Chapel did not foreclose
a school from limiting subjects in its forum as long as the restrictions
89
were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. With that backdrop, the court
found that the school acted reasonably in not wanting to be identified
90
with a particular church.
Also, the court held the exclusion to be
viewpoint neutral because it had never opened the forum specifically to
91
religious worship services. The court found it permissible to draw a
distinction between religious worship/instruction on one hand, and
92
discussion of secular subjects from a religious viewpoint on the other.
In a petition to the United States Supreme Court, Bronx Household was
. d
.
. 91
deme cert10ran. -

84. !d. at
85.

* 19.

Bronx Household I. 127 F.3d at 207.

86. 1d at 21 7.

87. !d. at 213.
88. !d.
89. !d. at 21 1-12.
90. !d. at 214.

91.

!d.

92.

!d. at 215.

93. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0, 523 US. I 074, I 074 (1998).
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E. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of

New York (Bronx Household!!)

I. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

.

~~w

.

After the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Good News Cluh v.
95
Milford Central School, Bronx Household again applied to rent the
96
school, and again its application was denied. Accordingly, Pastors Hall
and Roberts sought a preliminary injunction in district court, arguing that
the Good News Club decision had overruled the Second Circuit's ruling
97
in Bronx Household I. In this second proceeding, the Bronx Household
provided more details about its intended use of the forum than in the
previous litigation: "the singing of Christian hymns and songs, prayer,
fellowship with other church members and Biblical preaching and
teaching, communion, shari~f of testimonies and social fellowship
among the church members." As already shown, Bronx Household had
previously requested that it rent the school for "h~mn singing,
9
communion, Bible reading, Bible preaching and teaching."
Bronx Household also emphasized that it "seek[s] to give honor and
praise to ... Jesus Christ in everything we do. To that end we sing songs
and hymns of praise to our Lord. We read the Bible and the pastors teach
from it because it tells us about God, what He wants us to do and how we
10
should live our lives."
Finally, Bronx Household emphasized the
importance of its Sunday morning meeting because "[i]t provides the
theological framework to engage in activities that benefit the welfare of
101
the community."
The meeting allowed the church to reaffirm its
commitment to help the needy among the community and their
102
congregation and to provide counseling for those with problems.
In analyzing Bronx Household's free speech claim, the court began

°

94. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S D.N.Y 2002).
95. 533 U.S. 9R (2001).
96. Bronx Household ofFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
See id. at 411. As an interesting side note, Pastors Hall and Roberts commenced this
action on September 10, 2001, the day before the tragic events at the World Trade Center in New
York City. Although the court relies on the reasoning of the newly-decided Good News Cluh
decision for its holding, the political and social climate of the time was certainly more favorable to
religious groups than during the previous litigation when access was denied.
97.

98. !d. at 410.
Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0 (Bronx Household/). 127 F.3d 207.
215 (2d Cir. 1997).
99.

I 00. Bronx Hous<'hold ofFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
101. !d.
102. !d.
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by noting that the Supreme Court in Good News Cluh specifically
mentioned the Bronx Household I decision among the appellate court
decisions that conflicted '"on the question of whether speech can be
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature
103
of the speech."'
The Supreme Court in Good News Club had
disagreed with the Bronx Household I court regarding the fact that the
'"characterization of the club's activities as religious in nature warranted
treating the club's activities as different in kind from the other activities
104
Striking down the Second Circuit's belief
permitted by the school."'
that a distinction could permissibly be drawn between religious worship
services and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint, the
Supreme Court had called such attempts "quixotic" when the subject
105
The school, in
matter is character development and moral teaching.
the context of a limited public forum, could not restrict activities that
although '"quintessentially religious,"' were not '"mere religious
. d.1vorce dfrom any teac h.mg o f mora I va Iues. "' 106
wors h 1p,
The court found that, like the activities in Good News Club, the
activities in Bronx Household could not be characterized as "'mere
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,"' and as
such could not be excluded from the limited public forum because of
107
their religious nature.
While the court noted that some of the church's
activities, if conducted alone, such as communion or prayer, could be
108
considered "mere religious worship,"
the court declined to separate
Bronx Household's individual activities into distinct speech
109
Instead, the court found that the church's activities were
categories.
consistent with activities expressly permitted in the forum, such as
"social, civic, and recreational meetings ... and other uses pertaining to
110
the welfare of the community."
Such activities as providing the needy
with food and clothing and counseling those with financial and emotional
103. !d. at413 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001)).
I 04. !d. at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110--11 ).
105. !d. at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
106. Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S.
111.112n.4).
107. !d. at 414.
108. !d.
109. !d at 413-15. Justice Stevens' dissent in Good Ne11·s Club. 533 U.S. 98, 128-133 (2001),
proposes separating religious speech into three categories: (I) religious speech that is simply speech
about a particular topic from a religious point of view, (2) religious speech that amounts to worship,
or its equivalent, (3) speech that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a
particular religious faith. Justice Stevens would find it permissible in a limited public form, such as
was found in Good News Cluh and Bronx Household(){ Faith, to exclude the last two categories of
speech, while allowing the first.
110. N.Y. Educ.

Law~

414 (McKinney 2000).
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problems pertain to the welfare of the community.
Furthermore
11 2
singing, eating, and socializing are clearly recreational activities.
Teaching church members to "love their neighbors as themselves" and to
113
help the poor can be fairly classified as teaching moral values.
The court found these facts to be "squarely within the Supreme
Court's precise holding in Good News Club: the activities are not limited
to 'mere religious worship' but include activities benefiting the welfare
of the community . . . and other activities that are consistent with the
114
defined purposes of the limited public forum."
The testimony of
Pastor Hall that "the Sunday morning meeting . . . provides the
theological framework to engage in activities that benefit the welfare of
the community" shows that Bronx Household engaged in these permitted
115
activities from a religious viewpoint.
The court also rejected the school's contention that worship is an
activity different in kind from other activities allowed by the forum
because it contains elements of ceremony and ritual that other activities
116
do not.
Here, the court observed that many permitted groups that use
the facilities to convey particular viewpoints, such as the Boy Scouts and
117
Legionaries, employ ceremony and ritual during their meetings.
Finally, the court commented that even if worship were an activity
different in kind from other activities permitted in the forum, an attempt
to distinguish between religious content and viewpoint where morals and
the welfare of the community is involved is not only "quixotic," but also
11
raises issues of excessive government entanglement with religion. x The
district court granted a preliminary injunction against the school to
prevent them from denying Bronx Household use of the facilities to
119
. wors h'1p services.
.
con duct the1r

2. United States Court ofAppealsfor the Second Circuit (2003)

120

Following the district court's preliminary injunction, the Board of
121
Education appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
After

I I2.

Bronx Household ojFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 4 I4-I 5.
!d.

II3.
I I4.

/dat4I4.
!d. at414-15.

115.

/d.at415.

I I I.

I I 6.

Bronx Household of Faith. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 415.

117.

ld.at416-17.

II X.

!d. at 421-23.

119. !d. at 427.
120. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household If). 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir.
2003).
I21.

!d. at 346.
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recitin~ the extensive procedural history of the Bronx Household f
1
case,
the court again analyzed the church's claim that the school had
violated its Free Speech rights under the First Amendment by excluding
a group seeking to rent the school premises for purposes of "religious
services or instruction," while allowing most other community groups to
12
rent the school. J Since the Board of Education appealed from a grant
of a preliminary injunction by a trial court, the court reviewed the trial
124
court's decision to determine whether it had abused its discretion.
The court ultimately agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs
were likely to establish that the defendants violated their First
Amendment Free Speech rights because of the factual parallels between
the activities in Good News Club and the activities at issue in this
125
The court noted that "the majority in Good News Club
case.
characterized the club's activiti as 'the teaching of morals and character
26
but also agreed with Justice Souter's
from a particular viewpoint,"'
characterization ofthe club's activities as involvin~ not only teaching but
12
In prohibiting the
also an '"evangelical service of worship."'
exclusion of the club from the forum as a violation of the Free Speech
clause, the majority simply observed that the activities at issue were not
"mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values."
128

Determining that Bronx Household's activities were more than just
worship, the court found that there was "no principled basis upon which
to distinguish the activities set out by the Supreme Court in Good News
Club from the activities that the Bronx Household of Faith has proposed
129
Like the Good News Club,
for its Sunday meetings" at the school.
Bronx Household "combine[ d] preaching and teaching with such
'quintessentially religious' elements as prayer, the singing of Christian
130
The church's meetings also contained
songs, and communion."
secular elements like the fellowship meal, which gave members a chance
to discuss individual problems and needs. On the basis of these facts, the
court concluded that "it cannot be said that the meetings of the Bronx
Household constitute only religious worship, separate and apart from any

122.

/d. at 345-4 7.

123.

/d. at 353 57.

124. !d. at

34~.

125. !d. at 354.

ld (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. SelL 533 U.S. 9X. Ill (200 I)).
ld (quoting Good Nell's Cluh. 533 US. at 138 (Souter. J .• dissenting)).
128. ld (quoting Good News Cluh, 533 US. at 112 n.4 (majority orinion)).
129. !d.
130. ld
126.

127.
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131

Since the Board of Education had allowed
teaching ofmoral values."
other groups to teach moral and character development on school
grounds, it could not exclude the church from its forum on the ground
that those same topics were being presented from a religious
.
.
132
v1ewpomt.
In concluding the discussion of Bronx Household's Free Speech
claim, the court noted several unresolved issues that remain in the wake
of Good News Club:
(1) Would [a court] be able to identify a form of religious worship that

is divorced from the teaching of moral values? (2) Should [a court]
continue to evaluate activities that include religious worship on a caseby-case basis, or should worship no longer be treated as a distinct
category of speech? (3) How does the distinction drawn in. . . earlier
precedent between worship and other forms of speech from a religious
viewpoint relate to the dichotomy suggested in Good News Club
between "mere" worship on the one hand and worship that is not
divorced from the teaching of moral values on the other? (4) How
would a state, without imposing its own views on religion, define
which values are morally acceptable and which arc not? And, if such a
choice is impossible to make, would the state be required to permit the
use of public school property by religious sects that preach ideas
commonly viewed as hateful? (5) When several religious groups seck
to use the same property at the same time, would not the state have to
choose between them? What criteria would govern that choice? (6) In
all of this process, i~ trere not a danger of excessive entanglement by
3
the state in religion?

Finally, the court concluded by rejecting the Board of Education's
argument that Bronx Household's exclusion from the forum was
134
The court
necessary to prevent an Establishment Clause violation.
relied on the Supreme Court's failure to find a valid Establishment
Clause interest as evidence of a similar lack of interest in Bronx
Household, notin!f again the factual similarities between this case and
35
Good News Club.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Miner criticized the majority's
conclusion that, based on the facts presented by Bronx Household's
pastors, "it cannot be said that the meetings of the Bronx Household of
Faith constitute only religious worship, separate and apart from any

131. ld
132. Id
133. ld at 355 (numbering added).
134. ld at 356.
135. Id
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136

teaching of moral values."'
Justice Miner reasoned that the majority
relied on evidence produced in a "self-serving" letter and affidavit
137
This letter, which Justice
prepared by Bronx Household's pastors.
Miner hinted was carefully crafted with the assistance of counsel,
"tellingly decline[s] to mention the church's intent to usc [school
facilities] for worship services and instead attempts to persuade the
rea~e: that .the c~ur~~,~~?ropose~ use ... [i~volvcd] instruction from a
'rehg10us v1ewpomt. · Accordmg to the d1ssent, the court should have
weighed the facts produced in Pastor Hall's deposition that "put to rest
any doubts about whether the church's proposed meetings are anything
139
but religious worship services."
Pastor Hall's deposition gives more
detail about the structure of the Sunday services, the administration of
140
communion, and the purpose of the meetings.
Based on Pastor Hall's
deposition, the dissent found the facts of this case "'as different from
141
Good News Club 'as night from day."'
The dissent also agreed with the Bronx Household I holding, that
"religious worship services could be prohibited from being held in public
school buildings without running afoul of the Free Speech Clause
142
remains good law."
In the dissent's view, the Supreme Court's ruling
that "constitutionally meaningful distinctions could not be drawn
between religious and secular viewpoints in the context of religious
143
instruction" did not disturb the Bronx Household I holding.
According
to the dissent, he Good News Club opinion did not address the religious
worship question at issue here, and instead confined its analysis to the
question of whether a group seeking to enga9e in religious instruction
44
could be excluded from a limited public forum.
The dissenting opinion concluded with Justice Miner emphasizing
that he agreed with the majority's finding that a religious group wanting
to teach moral and character development and desiring to hold meetings
designed to benefit the welfare of the community, should not be excluded
on the basis of its religious viewpoint, if the forum has allowed other
145
groups to conduct the same activities.
However, he stated that he
136. !d. at 360 (Miner, J., dissenting).
137. !d.
13X.

/d.

139. ld
140.

/d. at 360-61.

141 /d. at 365 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch, 533 U.S. 91\, 137 (2001)
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
142.

/d. at 364-65.

143.

ld

144.

/d.

145. ld at 366.
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cannot abide the majority's leap of logic based on the [Church's] selfserving statements that "their teaching comes from the viewpoint of the
Bible" and their emphasis on the social and community aspects of the
"meetings" of the church, their religious worship services are suddenly
-h
d mto
.
.
.
. 146
trans1orme
speec h -h1rom are I.IgJOus
v1ewpomt.
The dissent would hold that Bronx Household's activities were
religious worship-"nothing more and nothing less"-and that its
activities could still be excluded from a limited public forum following
147
Finally, the dissent raised concerns
the Good News Cluh decision.
about a possible Establishment Clause violation if Bronx Household
14
were allowed to hold its worship services on the school property. ~

III. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
Although the Bronx Household II opinion presents several questions
for reflection, many of those questions are simply different ways of
characterizing the first inquiry presented in Good News Cluh: "Would [a
court] be able to identify a form of religious worship that is divorced
149
,-tTOm t h e teac h.mg o t' mora I va1ues '"'
Presumabl y, t h.IS question
. raises
.
r
the issue of whether, based on the facts of a particular case, a court could
identify "pure" religious worship that is divorced from the teaching of
moral values, and thus constitutionally permit its exclusion from a
limited public forum on the basis of its content. The Bronx Household
court's apparent confusion on this issue stems from Justice Thomas's
150
vague language in the Supreme Court's Good News Club decision.
Althou~h the Bronx Household 11 court professed to be unclear on this
1
issue,
analyzing the court's reasoning and holding in light ofthe Good
News Club decision shows that the Second Circuit's purported confusion
is somewhat unfounded. If the Bronx Household II court felt in some
way "unguided" by Supreme Court precedent on this issue, its opinion
does not appear to reflect this feeling of uncertainty.
This question of identifying religious worship divorced from moral

146.
147.

!d.

!4X.

!d at 366-6 7.

!d

149. It is interesting to note that the cout1. as evidence of the complexity of the i"ues that it is
unable to resolve. pairs this question with such obviously unanswerable philosophical queries as.
"How would [a] state, without imposing its own views on religion. dctlnc which values arc morally
acceptable and which are not' 1" /d. at 355.
150. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001 ). The fitct that Justice
Thomas's vague language was found in a footnote instead of the body of the opinion may have
fut1her contributed to the court's confusion about how much weight to give his statements.
151.

Bronx Household II, 331 F.3d at 355.
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values comes from the majority's holding in Good News Cluh.
In that
case, the Supreme Court found the Christian Club's social, moral, and
religious activities to be indistinguishable from those in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger because the club sought to address an otherwise
permissible subject~the teaching of morals and character~from a
153
religious viewpoint.
Disagreeing with the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals that "something that is 'quintessentially religious' ... cannot
also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character
154
development from a particular viewpoint,"
the Supreme Court
concluded that "the club's activities do not constitute mere religious
155
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values."
Because the
activities were not merely worship, the club's exclusion from the limited
156
public forum was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
This conclusion by the Supreme Court is most significant for its
implied message. Here, the court seems to be saying that had the club
engaged in activities that could be characterized as "'mere religious
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,'" a valid
distinction could be drawn between pure religious worship and the
157
expression of a religious viewpoint on otherwise permissible subjects.
This would allow a court to exclude a group intending to use a limited
public forum for worship on the basis of its content as long as religious
158
worship had never been permitted in the forum.
In practical
application, however, is it possible to distinguish between religious
viewpoint and worship? If it is possible to draw a distinction, would a
court be willing to do so? As shall be discussed below, the Bronx
Household II opinion indicates that the court has already answered its
own questions~it is neither possible nor likely.

A. Bronx Household II Reasoning and Analysis
I. District Court
The district court m the initial Bronx Household I case held the
school district's restrictions on religious worship to be both reasonable
152.

Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 1 12 n.4.

153. /d. at 110-12. The fact that the club's activities were, according to the dissent and
acknowledged by the majority, an "evangelical service of worship" had no bearing on the overall
issue of whether the activities could be excluded from the forum. /d. at 13S.
154. !d. at 1 1 1.
155. !d. at 112 n.4.
156. Good News C/uh, 533 U.S. at 112.
157. See Manning, supra note 9, at S70.
158. See id
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and viewpoint neutral.
With respect to viewpoint neutrality, the court
drew a line between speech from a religious viewpoint, which the policy
specifically allowed, and reli¥ious worship services, which had never
60
been allowed in the forum.
Although the court recognized that
religious worship services may be considered the ultimate form of speech
from a religious viewpoint in an open forum, in the context of a limited
public forum, a permissible distinction could be drawn between speech
161
In the court's view,
from a religious viewpoint and religious worship.
exclusion of religious worship services would be content discrimination,
which is allowed in a limited public forum, and not impermissible
162
viewpoint discrimination.
The court not only found this distinction to be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral, but it also found it easy to make the distinction
between discussions of secular matters from a religious viewpoint-a
characterization that presumably comes from its interpretation of the
163
Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel-and religious worship.
Thus, the court would restrict a religious group's use of the school's
facilities to presentation of secular matters from a religious viewpoint,
rather than more directly religious viewpoints-including that of
164
worship-on both religious and secular subjects.
Following the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Good News Club,
the district court began to sing a different tune regarding the distinction
between religious worship and the presentation of religious viewpoints.
Reviewing the Bronx Household I decision in a case involving the same
issues and parties, the district court in Bronx Household II reached the
165
In so doing, the Bronx Household II court
opposite conclusion.
demonstrated the reality and force of the Good News Club's implied
message that although it might be possible in theory to find a form of

15lJ. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx 1/ouseho/d 1), 127 F.3d 207,
215 (2d Cir. \997).

I 60. s~e id. at 214. The court found that it was reasonable for a state and school district to
adopt a regulation that would avoid identifying a middle school with a particular church because of
the consequences it would have on the minds of the children. Additionally, the court believed it to be
a proper state function to decide the extent to which the school and church groups should remain
separate. !d.
I6I

!d. at 215.

\62.

ld

I 63. Bronx Household f. 127 F.3d at 215. Even Judge Cabrancs, the sole dissenter from the
three-Judge panel, would uphold the ban on religious worship because such activity cannot be
properly understood to be a vehicle for the presentation of both secular and religious viewpoints and
is therefore a form of content exclusion, permissible in a limited public forum. !d. at 221 (Cabranes,
J., dissenting).
164.

/d.at214.

I 65.

Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 40 I. 427 (S.D.N. Y. 2002 ).
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religious worship that is divorced from the teaching of morals and
character, in practice a court's ability and willingness to make this
166
distinction is not only unlikely, but rather "quixotic."
Judge Jacob's
Second Circuit dissent in Good News Club articulates this principle and
demonstrates why its application to complex real-life situations is so
difficult:
The majority argues that the activities of the club are
"quintessentially religious," while the other groups deal only with the
"secular subject of morality." The fallacy of this distinction is that it
treats morality as a subject that is secular by nature, which of course, it
may be or not, depending on one's point of view. Discussion of morals
and character from purely secular viewpoints of idealism, culture or
general uplift will often appear secular, while discussion of the same
issues from a religious viewpoint will often appear essentiallyquintessentially-religious. "There is no indication when 'singing
hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles' cease to be
'singing, teaching, and reading' -all apparently forms of 'speech,'
despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected
167
'worship.'"
Even the idea of being able to identify "in theory" a form of religious
worship divorced from moral and character development is problematic.
For example, would a group that desired to use Milford Central School's
facilities to hold a simple prayer appealing to a higher being for
assistance or to give thanks be excluded under the Good News Club
holding? What about a group whose only activity consists of serving
communion or performing a baptism? Because these activities do not
expressly teach a moral lesson, a court might find that they constitute
"pure worship," divorced from the teaching of moral values or character.
However, it certainly could be argued that these forms of religious
activities, although not expressly teaching moral or character
development, could nevertheless serve as the foundation for the teaching
168
of moral values or character development.
In the alternative, mere
acknowledgement of a higher being or a person's dependence on such
169
could of itself be considered a moral lesson.

166. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 FJd 502, 512 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs. J ..
dissenting).
167. /d. at 515 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 545 U.S. 263,269 n.6 (1981) (internal citation
omitted)).
16X. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, Ill (2001) ("What matters for
purposes of the Free Speech Clause is that we can sec no logical difference in kind between the
invocation of Christianity by the club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty. or patriotism by other
associations to provide a foundation for their lessons.").
169. Judge Jacob's Second Circuit dissent in Good Nnn C/uh acknowledged the difficulty in
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This approach is also problematic in the sense that it would require a
court to determine on behalf of a religious group, in a way that is
potentially contrary to the religious group's own sincerely held views,
which forms of worship are cleanly separated from the teaching of moral
values. For most groups and activities, it is safe to assume that such clean
breaks cannot be readily made. If the group itself could not make this
distinction, it is doubtful that a court, guided only by the limited
perspective of written briefs and condensed oral arguments, could fairly
make the distinction. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lee v.
170
Weisman,
a school prayer case, succinctly evaluates this concern: "I
can hardly imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the
federal judiciary, or more deliberately to be avoided where possible ...
171
[than] comparative theology."
Rather than risking mistake, most
172
courts will likely choose to "err on the side of free speech,"
as was the
173
case in Bronx Household JJ.
Another related difficulty in making fine distinctions between
worship and presentation of religious viewpoints~made very clear in the
Bronx Household If opinion~results from the inherently broad and
variable definition of worship itself. For example, although worship
commonly connotes a religious activity, Pastor Hall, from The Bronx
Household of Faith, presented a different perspective in his deposition to
174
the court.
Pastor Hall acknowledged that "worship" is often linked to
religious activity, but is not necessarily exclusively religious in
175
nature.
In his view (and presumably that of many members of his
congregation), worship is a "neutral" word, having neither a solely
religious nor solely irreligious meaning; worship simply means "to
176
ascribe worth to something."
Used in the more neutral sense, Pastor Hall found no difficulty in
stating that he worships athletic prowess, masterful works of art, and
beautiful displays of nature, along with his "traditional" worship of Jesus

distinguishing between religious content and viewpoint. In such instances, he argued, the court
should "err on the side of free speech ... [since] [t]he concerns supporting free speech greatly
outweigh those supporting regulation of the limited public forum." Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
170. 505 U.S. 577! 1992)
I 71.

ld at 616-17 (Souter, J ., concurring).

172. Good News C!uh. 202 F.3d at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
173. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household/!), 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir.
2003)
174. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).
175. ld
I 76. !d.
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Christ.
Here again, the difficulty courts have in dissecting the
religious speech at issue is obvious. Worship-a seemingly clear termis not so clear after all in the context of individuals' particular religious
views. On these grounds, the district court in Bronx Household II
concluded that even if it were possible to distinguish religious viewpoint
and religious worship, a court should not become entangled in such
. . an d u It1mate
.
Iy unsatis1actory
. +:
subJective
en deavors. ln
In any event, the Bronx Household II court's interpretation of Good
News Club has made these fine speech distinctions now nearly irrelevant.
The Bronx Household II court adopted not only the Good News Club
majority's position but also the consequences of the rule's practical
application; it is now nearly impossible for a court to distinguish between
religious worship that contains moral and character development and
179
worship that does not.
The effect of this is to ensure that all religious
groups-even those seeking to use the forum for "quintessentially"
religious purposes or for "pure worship"-must be allowed to participate
in the limited public forum once it has been opened generally for moral
and character development, activity pertaining to the welfare of the
community, or any other enumerated forum purpose that might
. d w1t
. h t h ere I'1gwus
.
reasonabl y b e pa1re
wors h'1p. lXO
The practical effect of the Good News Club court's reasoning is
evident from the holding and reasoning of the Bronx Household II
opinion. The district court in Bronx Household II began its analysis by
noting that the Supreme Court mentioned the Second Circuit in Bronx
Household I as one of the courts conflicted on the issue of whether
speech can be excluded from a limited public forum because of the
181
religious nature of the speech.
The Supreme Court then disagreed
with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Bronx Household I that
characterizing activities as religious in nature warranted treating the
182
activities differently than secular activities.
Additionally, the Supreme
177. !d.
178. !d. at 423.
179. Bronx Household of Faith v. !3d. of Educ. (Bronx Household If), 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d
Cir. 2003).
180. See Austin W. Bramwell, Juris Doc/ores or Doctores /Ji,·initotis: Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, 533 US WI !2001), 25 HARV. J.L. & PU13. PO!'Y 385,391 (2001 ). Although
not addressed in this paper, the Bronx 1/ouschold II court's concern over whether groups whose
v icws are commonly viewed as hateful may be allowed to use the forum for expressive purposes
comes into play. It would certainly seem that if a group could correlate its activity to a permitted
forum purpose. it could strongly argue that its exclusion would be on the basis of viewpoint. See
Bronx Household II, 331 F.3d at 355.
181. Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Seh., 533 U.S. 98. 105 (2001 )).
182. !d. (quoting (iood News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 110-11).
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Court did not think it plausible to draw a distinction between religious
183
worship services and other speech from a religious viewpoint.
The majority obviously was aware of, but rejected, Justice Stevens's
dissent in Good News Club, which would have permitted a court to
dissect the religious s~eech at issue and categorize it according to its
1 4
nature and purpose.
Allowing the court to carefully scrutinize
religious speech, in his view, was especially appropriate in a school
185
setting.
Justice Stevens saw no problem with letting a public school
limit the scope of the forum it had created by excluding speech that is
186
essentially "worship" or "proselytizing" in nature.
The rejection of
Justice Stevens's proposal sent a strong message (or at least was
apparently a clear indication) to the Bronx Household II court, which
faithfully applied the message in its subsequent rulings; when the speech
at issue is religious, a court should not attempt to dissect or
compartmentalize the speech in a way that separates religious worship
. .
.
. 187
f rom re I1gwus v1ewpomt.
Following the Good News Club's reasoning, the district court in
Bronx Household II also declined to dissect speech and classify it
188 Th
· re 1·Igwus
.
. d out t hat some o f
accor d .mg to Its
nature.
e court pomte
the Bronx Household's activities, like prayer and communion, could
arguably be termed "mere religious worship," but nevertheless noted that
some of the church's other activities, such as teaching its members to
love one another and helping its members and others in the community to
abandon destructive lifestyles, were clearly consistent with the limited
forum's express allowance of uses pertaining to the welfare of the
189
·
N ot WI'II.mg to separate the two .,10rms o f expressiOn,
.
commumty.
the
cowi essentially held that as long as a religious group could ground its
"pure worship" in some permissible forum purpose, both forms would be
190
allowed.

I Xl.

!d. (quoting Good News Club. 533 U.S. at Ill).

I X4. s·ee Good Nell'S C/uh, 533 U.S. at 130-34 (Stevens, J, dissenting); see also supra note
I 09. Justice Stevens's dissent also recognized that while the government may not restrict speech
about an authorized topic based on the speaker's viewpoint, it has broad discretion to preserve the
propc11y for its intended usc by enforcing content restrictions. Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 130--31
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 ( 1976)).

Good Nnrs Club, 533 U.S. at 133.
I Xh. !d. at 130.

I X5.

I 87. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Good News Cluh also noted that the Supreme Court
has "previously rejected the attempt to distinguish worship from other religious speech" since '"the
distinction has [no] intelligible content,' and ... no 'relevance' to the constitutional issue." /d. at
126 (Scalia. L concurring) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263. 269 n.6 ( 1981 )).

lXX.

Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. ofEduc .. 226 F. Supp. 2d 401.421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

189.

/d.

190. The court cmrhasizcd that a "moral" purpose was not necessarily required to prevent the
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As further evidence of the court's unwillingness to dissect or
carefully scrutinize the religious speech at issue, the Bronx Household II
court also rejected, as being precluded by Good News Club, the School
District's argument that Bronx Household's overall activity, when
viewed as a whole, was essentially worship because all of the church's
individual proposed activities, whether marginally worship or entirely
worship, were "linked by the overarching purpose of religious
191
worship."
The court noted, as was emphasized in Good News Club,
that decidedly religious or "quintessentially religious" activities should
not be treated any differently for purnoses of viewpoint neutrality
1 2
analysis than other permitted activities.
Again, the message is clear
that no form of religious activity or speech may be excluded because of
its substance or nature so long as it is grounded in some permissible
forum purpose.
2. Second Circuit Court ofAppeals

In a brief opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's granting of a preliminary injunction to Bronx Household on
the grounds that the church was "substantially likely to establish that
193
defendants violated their First Amendment free speech rights."
The
court found the district court's reliance on the reasoning of Good News
Club to be sensible since it found "no principled basis upon which to
distinguish the activities set out by the Supreme Court in Good News
Club from the activities that the Bronx Household of Faith has proposed
194
for its Sunday meetings."
Both groups' activities combined preaching
and teaching with "quintessentially religious" elements like prayer and
195
hymns.

exclusion of the religious worship from the forum. As long as the worship is coupled with an activity
included in the forum's permitted uses, the inclusion would comport with the Good News Club
reasoning. !d. at 415 n.X.
191. !d. The majority also rejects the argument that worship can easily be identified by the
usual characteristic of having ritual or ceremony. Even assuming that l~tct were true, groups such as
the Boy Scouts and Legionnaires use ceremony and ritual as the foundation for their viewpoints. !d.
As such, if the church's exclusion was based on its use of ceremony and ritual, it was only because it
wa-. religious in nature --which is clear viewpoint discrimination. !d. at 416-17. See Lamb's Chapel
\. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,394 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Bronx Household o(Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (quoting Good News Cluh. 533 U.S. at
Ill). The court also notes that such an argument had already been rejected by the court in Widmar l'.
l'ince/11, where the majority specifically rejected the dissent's view that a class of unprotected
religious speech called "'worship" should be created. !d. (citing Widmar. 454 U.S. at 270).
193. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household II). 331 F.3d 342, 354 (2d
Cir. 2003).
194. !d.
195. !d.
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Viewing the similarity between the facts of this case and those of
Good News Club to be dispositive, the court only found it necessary to
explicitly affirm the district court's finding that Bronx Household's
activities, like those of the Good News Club, were not religious worship
divorced from the teaching of moral values or other permitted
196
subjects.
As such, it could not be excluded from the limited public
197
A !though
forum on the basis of the rei igious viewpoint it espoused.
the court declined to address the district court's determinations that ( 1)
after Good News Cluh, religious worship cannot be treated as an
inherently distinct activity, and (2) the distinction between religious
speech and worship cannot meaningfully be drawn by the courts, the
court did acknowledge that its previously held view to the contrary in
Bronx Household I was "seriously undermined" by the Good News Club
. .
198
d eCJSIOn.
The court's refusal to review the district court's findings in these two
areas may be a proper use of judicial restraint, but the issues, whether the
court chooses to formally address them or not, have already been decided
in previous Supreme Court decisions, at least in practical effect. On the
basis of these decisions, the district court in Bronx Household II had no
trouble deciding that religious worship cannot be treated as an activity
199
inherently different from other forms of expression.
Likewise, the
Good News Club opinion and its application in Bronx Household II
demonstrate that courts are neither well-equipped nor any longer
. d to d'1ssect an d categonze
. re ]'Igwus
.
perm1tte
speec h .200
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether worship can be
201
treated as an inherently distinct activity in Good News Cluh.
In
looking at this question, it is important to remember that the issue
presented in that case was whether "speech can be excluded from a
limited ~ublic forum on the basis of the religious nature of the
02
speech."
In answering in the negative, the Supreme Court specifically
disagreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that
"characterization of the club's activities as religious in nature warranted
treating the club's activities as different in kind from other activities

196. !d.
197. /d.
19X. !d. at 355.
199. !d. at 357.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 165-169; Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263. 269 n.6
(19R I).

20 I. Good News Club v. Milt(ml Cent. Sch .. 533 U.S. 9X (200 I).
202. !d. at I 05.
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203

permitted by the schoo1."
The Supreme Court also termed the Second
Circuit's attempt in Bronx Household I to distinguish between religious
viewpoint and worship when morals and character are involved as
204
"quixotic."
Ultimately, the court found no difference between
quintessentially religious activities such as worship and secular
. . .
205
act1v1t1es.
Twenty years earlier, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether courts may draw a meaningful distinction
206
between religious speech and worship.
In that case, the court
explicitly recognized that worship is a form of speech protected by the
207
In so doing, it rejected the dissent's argument to
First Amendment.
the contrary, which would have created a "new [unprotected] class of
208
religious 'speech' ... constituting 'worship. "'
The majority believed
the dissent's proposed plan to be unworkable because there was no
indication of when indisputably religious speech such as prayer ceases to
209
be "just prayer" and becomes unprotected worship.
This conclusion's continuing validity is evidenced by the majority's
rejection of the dissenting opinions in Good News Club, which would
have allowed courts to carefully scrutinize and catelforize the religious
2
Furthermore, the
speech at issue, separating viewpoint from worship.
majority's description ofthe club's activities, in generic and broad terms,
shows the court's reluctance to determine "at what point religious
211
The
content [, like worship,] becomes religious viewpoint."

°

203. /dat 110-11.
204. !d. at Ill (quoting Good News Cluh, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
205. See Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501, 1506-07 (8th Cir. 1994)
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court has continually "refused to cabin religious speech into a
separate excludible speech category"): Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Seh. Dist., 508
U.S 384,393 (1993).
206.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.

207. !d. at 270.
208. !d at 269 n.6.
209. See id.; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2001) (Scalia,
J., concurring). A possible distinction between Widmar and the Bronx Household II decisions is the
differing fora in the two cases. The Widmar court analyzed the free speech issue in light of a
"generally open forum," Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269, while the Bronx Household II court looked at it in
light of a limited public tixum. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401,413
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). However. the Good News C/uh court analyzing the free speech issue in the context
of a limited open forum also implicitly reached a similar conclusion in its rejection of Justice
Stevens's dissent. See c;ood News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Manning, supra
note 9, at 871-72.
210. Gastel. supra note 9, at 182. The author finds the majority's reluctance to draw this line
problematic because not only is the court "in the business of line drawing," but Justice Stevens's
dissent proposes an intriguing scheme in which to do so.
2 I I. !d. at 181.
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overgeneralization of facts and the court's refusal to draw the line
between religious viewpoint and content, such as worship, suggests the
Supreme Court's willingness to provide increased protection to all forms
212
of speech, and specifically religious speech.
Finally, the Supreme
Court's familiar adage again rings true that even if it were possible to
draw this line, courts are not properly suited to make these fine
distinctions. Such judicial scrutiny of religious words and practices
would "inevitably . . . entangle the state with religion in a manner
213
forbidden by our cases."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's precedents in the area of limited speech in
public fora over the last twenty-five years show the court's increasing
willingness to grant First Amendment Free Speech rights to religious
groups, even in such traditionally protected areas as public schools.
Although the court started modestly in Widmar by merely allowing equal
access to religious groups when a forum had been generally opened for
expression, the subsequent cases gradually began to expand the scope of
expressive and religious freedom for after-school groups using public
school facilities. Good News Club marked the culmination of this
expansion of religious freedom when the Supreme Court redrew the lines
separating church and state and effectively gave religious groups free
reign to hold meetings and conduct "quintessentially religious" activities
such as worship on state-owned property.
If the Supreme Court did not mean to extend the rights of Free
Speech as far as it did in Good News Club, it must clarify the issues that
the Bronx Household II court found to be confusing. Otherwise, as the
Bronx Household II opinion shows, lower courts will interpret the Good
News Club holding broadly and grant all religious groups access to a
limited public forum as long as they can pair their "quintessentially
religious" activities with some permissible forum purpose. In practical
effect, lower courts will no longer attempt to distinguish religious
worship from the presentation of religious viewpoint. Whether this will
positively or negatively impact church-state relations remains to be seen.
What is clear, however, is that lines between them have been redrawn in
a way that will affect the American public.

Kevin Fiet

212.

!d.

213.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.

